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Abstract
Patrolling is one of the central problems in operational security. Formally, a patrolling problem is
specified by a set U of nodes (admissible defender’s positions), a set T ⊆ U of vulnerable targets, an
environment E ⊆ U ×U (admissible defender’s moves), and a function d which to every target u assigns
the time d(u) ∈ N needed to complete an intrusion at u. The goal is to design an optimal strategy for a
defender who is moving from node to node and aims at detecting possible intrusions at the targets. The
defender can detect an intrusion at a target u only by visiting u before the intrusion is completed. The
goal of the attacker is to maximize the probability of a successful attack, and the defender aims at the
opposite. We assume that the attacker is adversarial, i.e., he knows the strategy of the defender and can
observe her moves.
We prove that the defender has an optimal strategy for every patrolling problem. Further, we show
that for every ε > 0, there exists a finite-memory ε-optimal strategy for the defender constructible in
exponential time (in the size of the game), and we observe that such a strategy cannot be computed in
polynomial time unless P = NP.
Since (sub)optimal strategy synthesis is computationally hard for patrolling problems in general
environments, we continue our study by restricting ourselves to fully connected environments where
E = U × U (where we can safely assume that T = U). Then, a patrolling problem is fully determined
by its signature, i.e., a function S such that S (k) is the total number of targets with attack length equal
to k. We assume that S is encoded by using binary numbers, i.e., the encoding size of S can be expo-
nentially smaller than the number of targets. We start by establishing an upper bound on the value of a
given patrolling problem, i.e., we bound the maximal probability of successfully defended attacks that
can be achieved by the defender against an arbitrary strategy of the attacker. The bound is valid for an
arbitrary patrolling problem such that T = U and depends only on the signature S . Then, we introduce a
decomposition method which allows to split a given patrolling problem G into smaller subproblems and
construct a defender’s strategy for G by “composing” the strategies constructed for these subproblems.
Using this method, we can synthesize (sub)optimal defender’s strategies in time which is proportional to
the encoding size of S . Consequently, we can compute (sub)optimal strategies for exponentially larger
patrolling problems then the existing methods based on mathematical programming, where the size of
the programs is proportional to the number of targets. Finally, for patrolling problems with T = U and
a well-formed signature, i.e., a signature S such that k divides S (k) for every k ∈ N, we give an exact
classification of all sufficiently connected environments where the defender can achieve the same value
as in the fully connected uniform environment. This result is useful for designing “good” environments
where the defender can act optimally.
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1 Introduction
A central problem in security and operational research is how to deploy limited security resources (such
as police patrols, security guards, etc.) to maximize their effectiveness. Clearly, police patrols cannot
be everywhere all the time, security guards cannot check every door every minute, etc., which raises a
crucial question how to utilize them best. Game theoretic approaches to operational security problems
based on Stackelberg model have received much attention in recent years (see, e.g., [24]). Informally, the
problem is to find the best possible strategy for a defender who is supervising potentially vulnerable targets
(such as airports, banks, or patrol stations) and aims at detecting possible intrusions. The time needed to
complete an intrusion at each target is finite, and the aim of the defender is to maximize the probability
of discovering an intrusion before it is completed. An intensive research in this area has led to numerous
successful applications (see, e.g., [21, 14]). Due to high demand for practically usable solutions, the main
emphasis has been put on inventing methods that can produce working solutions for large-scale instances
quickly. In most cases, the problem is simplified (for example, by restricting the set of defender’s strategies
to some manageable subclass), and various tricks are used to avoid non-linear constraints and/or objectives.
This approach enables efficient synthesis of strategies that are “good enough” for practical purposes (thus,
the main engineering goal is achieved), but does not allow for synthesizing optimal or ε-strategies (for a
given ε > 0) in general. Further, the size of the resulting mathematical program is usually proportional
to the number of targets, which influences the scalability of these methods. Since developing the basic
theory of the underlying game model has not received so much attention as designing practically usable
solutions, many fundamental questions (such as the computability of the Strackelberg value, the existence
and computability of an optimal/ε-optimal defender’s strategy, etc.) are open or have even been answered
incorrectly. In this paper, we provide a solution for some of these problems. As an unexpected payoff of
our study, we also obtain a completely new approach to synthesizing defender’s strategies in security games
with fully connected environment based on compositional reasoning, which avoids the use of mathematical
programming and can be applied to exponentially larger instances than the currently available methods. A
detailed explanation of the achieved results is given below.
In this paper, we consider the adversarial variant of patrolling, where the attacker is assumed to be quite
powerful—he can observe defender’s moves, and he even knows defender’s strategy. However, he cannot
predict the way of resolving the defender’s randomized choice. Formally, a patrolling problem G is specified
by a finite set U of nodes (possible defender’s positions), a set T ⊆ U of targets, an initial node uˆ ∈ T (the
initial position of the defender), an environment E ⊆ U × U (admissible moves of the defender) and a
function d : T → N which to every target associates the corresponding attack length. The defender starts
at uˆ and then moves from node to node consistently with E. We assume that traversing every edge takes
precisely one unit of time (longer moves can be modeled by inserting intermediate nodes.) The defender
may choose the next node randomly and independently of her previous choices. Formally, a defender’s
strategy is a function σ : H → ∆(U) where H is the set of all finite non-empty sequences of nodes and
∆(U) is the set of all probability distributions over U. We require that σ is consistent with E, i.e., the support
of σ(h) is a subset of nodes that are immediate successors of the last node of h. Note that each σ determines
a unique probability space over all runs (infinite paths in (U, E)) initiated in uˆ in the standard way, and we
use Pσ to denote the associated probability measure.
Depending on the observed walk of the defender, the attacker may choose to attack some target or
wait (we assume that the attacker may attack at most once during a play). More precisely, an attacker’s
strategy is function π : H → T ∪ {⊥} such that whenever π(h) , ⊥, then for all proper prefixes h′ of h
we have that π(h′) = ⊥. Since the attacker has a complete knowledge about the current position of the
defender, he would never attack a target currently visited by the defender. Still, he may attack this target
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uˆ = u0
d(u0) = d(u1) = d(u2) = 2
σ∗(h) = µℓ, ℓ = |h|mod 2
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µ1(u1) = κ,
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κ = (√(5) − 1)/2
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uˆ = v0
d(v0) = d(v1) = d(v2) = 3
d(t0) = d(t1) = 2
σ∗(h) = µℓ,ℓ′
ℓ = |h|mod 3, ℓ′ = |h|mod 2
µi, j selects uniformly
between vi and t j
Figure 1: Two examples of patrolling problems and the corresponding optimal defender’s strategies.
immediately after the defender’s departure, i.e., long before the defender arrives to the next node (think of
an UAV patrolling military bases). This assumption is reflected in the definition of a discovered attack—if
the current location of the defender is u and the attacker attacks a target v, the defender has to visit the
node v within the next d(v) time units to discover this attack, even if u = v. The aim of the defender is to
maximize the probability of successfully detected (or not initiated) attacks, while the attacker aims at the
opposite. Given a strategy σ of the defender and a strategy π of the attacker, we use Pσ(D[π]) to denote
the probability of all infinite paths w initiated in uˆ such that either π(h) = ⊥ for every prefix h of w (i.e., no
attack is encountered along w), or π(h) = v ∈ T for some prefix h of w and v is among the nodes visited after
h in w in at most d(v) transitions (i.e., w contains a successfully defended attack). The value of σ is defined
by val(σ) = infπ Pσ(D[π]), where π ranges over all strategies of the attacker. The Stackelberg value of G is
defined by val = supσ val(σ), where σ ranges over all strategies of the defender. A defender’s strategy σ∗
is ε-optimal (where ε ≥ 0) if val(σ∗) ≥ val − ε. A 0-optimal strategy is called optimal.
Remark 1.1. In our definition of the patrolling problem, we assume that all targets are equally important
to the defender (and the attacker). The results A and B presented below remain valid even if we extend the
model by assigning numerical weights to nodes and modify the game objective so that the defender/attacker
aims at maximizing/minimizing the expected weight of a discovered attack. If the weight (importance) of
nodes is different for each player, the game is no longer zero-sum, and the solution concept becomes some-
what different (consequently, our results do not apply in this case).
Two simple examples. To get some intuition about the patrolling problem, we start with two simple exam-
ples that will also be used to demonstrate some of our results. Let us first consider the patrolling problem
of Fig. 1 (left). Here, we need to patrol three nodes with the same attack length 2 (i.e., T = U), where u0
is the initial node, in a fully connected environment. Let us try to determine the Stackelberg value and an
optimal strategy of the defender. A naive idea is to pick a strategy σ which always selects each of the three
immediate successors with probability 1/3. Consider a strategy π of the attacker such that π(u0) = u2. We
have that Pσ(D[π]) = 1/3 + 2/3 · 1/3 = 5/9, and one can easily verify that for every attacker’s strategy π′
we have that Pσ(D[π′]) ≥ 5/9. Hence, val ≥ val(σ) = 5/9. However, the defender can do better. Consider
the strategy σ∗ defined in Fig. 1 (left). Observe that σ∗ is independent of the currently visited node; the only
relevant information about the history of a play is whether its length is even or odd. If it is even (odd), then
σ∗ randomly selects between u0 and u2 (or between u1 and u2) where the ratio between the two probabilities
is the golden ratio. One can check that for every defender’s strategy π we have that Pσ∗(D[π]) ≥ (√5−1)/2.
Hence, val ≥ (√5 − 1)/2 > 5/9. In fact, the strategy σ∗ is optimal, i.e., val = (√5 − 1)/2, which is perhaps
unexpected (see also the paragraph “Comments on D” below).
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Now consider the patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (right). Here we need to patrol five nodes (T = U);
two of them have the attack length 2 and three of them have the attack length 3. Again, we assume a fully
connected environment. If we examine a naive strategy σ which always selects the next node uniformly
among all immediate successors, we obtain that val(σ) = 9/25. A better strategy σ∗ for the defender
is shown in Fig. 1 (right). The strategy σ∗ depends only on the length of the history modulo 6, and it
always chooses uniformly between exactly two nodes. It directly follows from our subsequent contributions
(namely C) that val = val(σ∗) = 1/2, i.e., σ∗ is optimal and the Stackelberg value is equal to 1/2.
Our contribution. We start by proving the following results about the general patrolling problem:
A. For an arbitrary patrolling problem, there exists an optimal strategy for the defender.
B. Given a patrolling problem G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) and a rational ε > 0, there is a finite-memory ε-optimal
strategy σ for the defender computable in time exponential in ||G|| and polynomial in ε−1 (here, ||G|| is
the encoding size of G, where the attack lengths are encoded in unary). Further, val(σ) is rational and
can also be computed in exponential time, i.e., we can also approximate val up to a given ε > 0 in
exponential time. We also observe that val cannot be approximated up to the error smaller than |U |−1 in
polynomial time unless P = NP.
Comments on A. The existence of optimal strategies for patrolling problems (and their variants) has been
claimed in previous works (see, e.g., [6, 5]) by arguing in the following way. For each j ∈ N, let Σ j be
the class of all defender’s strategies σ such that σ(h) depends only on the last j nodes of h. If we restrict
the range of σ to the strategies of Σ j in the definition of Stackelberg value, we obtain an approximated
value, denoted by val j. Obviously, val j+1 ≥ val j for every j ∈ N. By adapting the results of [13], it has
been shown in [5] that for every j ∈ N one can compute a strategy σ ∈ Σ j which achieves the outcome
val j or better against every attacker’s strategy. In [6, 5], it has been also claimed that val = val j for some
sufficiently large j (without providing any upper bound). The argument is based on applying general results
about strategic-form games, but a full proof is omitted. Using the techniques of Section 2.5, we prove that
this claim is incorrect, even for the simple patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (right) where the defender has no
optimal strategy in ⋃∞j=1 Σ j. In our proof of A, we take an infinite sequence of strategies σ1, σ2, . . . such
that limn→∞ val(σn) = val and “extract” and optimal strategy out of it.
Comments on B. Our exponential-time algorithm for constructing an ε-optimal strategy is based on combin-
ing two main ideas. First, we show that the Stackelberg value of a given game stays the same when the initial
target is changed. This implies that small perturbations in probability distributions employed by an optimal
strategy cause only a small change in the strategy value. Hence, we can compute a suitable discretization
scale and safely restrict the range of considered strategies to the discretized probability distributions. Let
ˆd = maxu∈U{d(u)}. The next important observation is that the ˆd-step behaviour of every strategy (after some
finite history) can be fully characterized by a real-valued vector with exponentially many components, where
each component corresponds to a probability of visiting some vertex in at most k ≤ ˆd transitions. Due to
the previous discretization step, we can safely restrict the range of these vectors to finitely (exponentially)
many values. It follows that if there is some ε-optimal strategy, then there is also an ε-optimal strategy
whose ˆd-step behaviour (after every finite history) can be characterized by one of these exponentially many
vectors, and we show how to check the existence of such a strategy in exponential time (this is perhaps the
most difficult part of the argument).
The lower complexity bound is trivial. Given a patrolling problem with d(u) = |U | = k for all u ∈ U, we
have that val = 1 iff the environment contains a directed cycle through all the nodes (i.e., it is a Hamiltonian
digraph), which is NP-hard to decide. If the game is a negative instance, then for every strategy of the
defender, the attacker clearly can launch an attack at the very beginning of a play with probability of success
at least 1/k. From this we immediately obtain the second part of B. Although in recent [20], it is shown that
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the problem whether val = 1 for a given patrolling problem is PSPACE-complete, the construction of [20]
only (for principal reasons) rules out, unless P = PSPACE, the existence of an ε-optimal strategy for the
defender with ε ≤ c · exp (−|U |) for some c > 0.
Since solving general patrolling problems is computationally hard, we continue our study by restricting
ourselves to fully connected environments, where E = U×U. Observe that the defender has no reason to visit
non-target nodes in fully connected environments, and hence we can further safely assume that T = U. For
example, think of a surveillance system equipped with several cameras installed in front of various doors,
where the footage of the cameras is shown in turns on a single screen (for some small constant amount of
time) watched by a human guard. The time needed to break (open and close) different doors can be different.
Then, the nodes/targets of the associated patrolling problem correspond to the cameras, the environment is
fully connected (assuming one can switch between the cameras freely), and the transition time between two
nodes is the same (and it can be normalized to 1). Under these assumptions, a patrolling problem is fully
specified by its signature, i.e., a function S : N → N0 which for a given k ∈ N returns the number of all
u ∈ T with d(u) = k. An important subclass of signatures are well-formed signatures, where k divides S (k)
for all k ∈ N. For example, the signature of the patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (right) is well-formed, while the
signature of the patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (left) is not. We assume that signatures are represented using
binary numbers, i.e., the encoding size of S , denoted by ||S ||, can be exponentially smaller than the number
of nodes.
Before formulating our results about the patrolling problem in a fully connected environment, we need
to explain one important conceptual contribution of this paper, which is the notion of a modular strategy
and the associated compositionality principle. A defender’s strategy σ is modular if σ(h) depends only on
the length of h modulo some constant c (in particular, note that the current defender’s position is irrelevant).
For example, the two strategies of Fig. 1 are modular (the constant c is equal to 2 and 6 for the strategy
on the left and on the right, respectively). Let G be a patrolling problem with a set of nodes U. For every
U′ ⊆ U, let G[U′] be the patrolling problem obtained from G by restricting the set of nodes to U′ and the set
of transitions to E ∩U′×U′ (note that this makes sense even if the environment of G is not fully connected).
Let U1, . . . ,Uk ⊆ U, and let σ1, . . . , σk be modular defender’s strategies in G[U1], . . . ,G[Uk], respectively.
For every probability distribution ν over {1, . . . , k}, we can construct the ν-composition of σ1, . . . , σk, which
is a modular defender’s strategy σ in G[U1∪· · ·∪Uk] defined by σ(h) = ν1 ·σ1(h)+ · · ·+νk ·σk(h). Note that
σ is a correctly defined defender’s strategy for G[U1 ∪ · · · ∪Uk] only if the environment of G contains all of
the required transitions between the nodes of U1, . . . ,Uk (if the environment of G is fully connected, this is
no issue). It follows immediately that val(σ) ≥ min{νi · val(σi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} (as we shall see, this inequality
can be strict). Thus, one can construct a defender’s strategy for a given patrolling problem G by splitting the
set of nodes into two or more subsets (not necessarily disjoint), solving the smaller instances recursively,
and then computing a suitable convex combination of the solutions. As we shall see momentarily, this
approach leads to an efficient algorithm capable of computing optimal (or suboptimal) strategies for very
large patrolling problems in couple of seconds.
Now we can explain our main results about the patrolling problem in a fully connected environment.
C. Given a patrolling problem G where T = U, we have that val ≤
(∑
k∈supp(S )
S (k)
k
)−1
where S is the sig-
nature of G and supp(S ) is the set of all k ∈ N such that S (k) > 0. This bound is valid for an arbitrary
environment E.
D. There is an algorithm which inputs a signature S of a patrolling problem G with a fully connected
environment (where T = U) and outputs a pair (θ,V) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
– The running time of the algorithm in polynomial in ||S ||.
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– θ is a symbolic representation of a modular strategy for G, and V is a symbolic representation of
val(θ). Both θ and V are parameterized by variables {p1, . . . , pk}, where k is bounded by a polynomial
in ||S ||. The values of {p1, . . . , pk} correspond to the unique solution (in [0, 1]k) of a recursive system
of polynomial equations that is also constructed by the algorithm. The number of variables k actually
depends on the “Euclid complexity” of S and can be constant (or even zero) for arbitrarily large S .
– If the signature S is well-formed, then k = 0 and the strategy θ is optimal. Since k = 0, no extra com-
putational time is needed to calculate/approximate the parameters, and hence θ is “fully synthesized”
in time polynomial in ||S ||.
– If the signature S is not well-formed, then the strategy θ is a ν-composition of simpler modular
strategies and the variables defined via the system of polynomial equations correspond to the weights
used to combine these simpler strategies together. Further, we have that vald < val(θ) < valu, where
vald and valu are the Stackelberg values of the patrolling problems with signatures Sd and Su defined
by Sd(k) = k · ⌊ nk ⌋ and Su(k) = k · ⌈ nk ⌉, respectively.
E. Given a patrolling problem G with T = U and a well-formed attack signature S , we say that the environ-
ment E of G is sufficiently connected if val is equal to the value of G in the fully connected environment.
The problem whether E is sufficiently connected is NP-complete. Further, this problem is NP-complete
even for a subclass of patrolling problems such that supp(S ) = {k}, where k ≥ 3 is a fixed constant. For
a subclass of patrolling problems where supp(S ) = {2}, the problem is solvable in polynomial time.
Comments on C. Note that the presented upper bound on val does not depend on E. An obvious ques-
tion is whether this bound is tight. That is, given a function S : N → N0 such that supp(S ) is finite,
we ask whether there exists a patrolling problem G with T = U such that the signature of G is S and
val = 1/(∑k∈supp(S ) S (k)/k). It follows from our results that the answer to this question is yes if S is well
formed. This means that the bound can be potentially lowered (only) for those S that are not well formed.
As an example, consider the patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (left). Here supp(S ) = {2} and S (2) = 3, and
hence we obtain val ≤ 2/3. Since val = (√5 − 1)/2 < 2/3, the bound is not tight. For the patrolling
problem of Fig. 1 (right) we have that supp(S ) = {2, 3}, S (2) = 2, and S (3) = 3, which gives an upper bound
(2/2 + 3/3)−1 = 1/2. Since val = 1/2, this bound is tight.
Comments on D. The strategy θ is obtained by applying the “decomposition” technique described earlier.
Since we intend to produce a strategy synthesis algorithm whose running time is polynomial in ||S ||, we
also need to design a special language allowing for compact representation of modular strategies in space
polynomial in ||S || (see Section 2.4). First, we split the nodes of G into disjoint subsets according to their
attack length. Then, we show how to compute a modular strategy for a set of n nodes with the same attack
length d. Here, we use a decomposition technique which resembles Euclid’s gcd algorithm. First we check
whether d divides n. If so, we split the n nodes into pairwise disjoint sets U0, . . . ,Ud−1 so that |Ui| = n/d
for every 0 ≤ i < d, and define a modular strategy σ such that σ(h) selects uniformly among the elements
of Ui, where i = |h| mod d. Observe that val(σ) = d/n, which is optimal by C. If d does not divide n and
n = k · d + c where 1 ≤ c < d, then we split the n nodes into two disjoint subsets U1 and U2, where U1
contains k · d nodes and U2 contains c nodes. A strategy σ1 for U1 is constructed as above, and we need to
process the set U2. If c divides d, the strategy σ2 for U2 is a simple loop over the nodes of U2. A closer
look reveals that an appropriate distribution ν = (ν1, ν2) for combining σ1 and σ2 should satisfy the equation
ν1 · val(σ1) = 1−νd/c1 which says that the nodes of U1 and U2 are defended equally well. If c does not divide
d and d = j · c + t, where 1 ≤ t < c, then the strategy σ2 for U2 spends the first j · c steps by performing
the simple loop over the nodes of U2, and the next t steps by behaving exactly as the strategy constructed
for |U2| nodes with attack length t (which is constructed recursively). Then, σ2 just keeps repeating its first
d steps. Again, we can setup an equation that should be satisfied by an appropriated distribution which
combines σ1 and σ2 so that all targets are protected equally well. This procedure eventually produces a
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modular strategy for defending n nodes with the same attack length d. If d divides n, then this strategy is
provably optimal. In fact, we conjecture that the constructed strategy is always optimal, but we leave this
hypothesis open (recently, it has been shown by Lamser [22] that the algorithm produces an optimal strategy
for all odd n and d = 2). Further, let us note that the number of variables/equations in the constructed
system of polynomial equations is bounded by a polynomial in ||S ||, but the size of S is not a good measure
for identifying hard instances. What really matters is the number of “swaps” in the Euclid’s algorithm
applied to n and d; see Section 2.4 for further comments. After processing all subsets of nodes with the
same attack length, we combine the resulting strategies using an appropriate distribution. The details are
given in Section 2.4.
As an example, consider the patrolling problems of Fig. 1. In the first case, we have 3 nodes with the
same attack length 2. Since 2 does not divide 3, we split the set of nodes into U1 = {u0, u1} and U2 = {u2}.
The strategy σ1 for U1 selects the node u1 or u0 with probability 1, depending on whether the length of the
history is odd or even, respectively. Note that val(σ1) = 1. For the set U2, we have that |U2| divides 2, and
so the strategy σ2 is a self-loop on u2. The appropriate distribution ν = (ν1, ν2) for combining σ1 and σ2
should satisfy the equation ν1 = 1 − ν21. Thus, we obtain that ν = κ = (
√
5 − 1)/2, which yields the strategy
of Fig. 1 (left). The strategy of Fig. 1 (right) is obtained by first splitting the set of nodes into U1 = {t0, t1}
and U2 = {v0, v1, v2} according to their attack length, solving these subproblems (note that the solution for
Ui is a strategy which loops over the vertices of Ui), and then combining them with ν = (0.5, 0.5).
Comments on E. We show that for every patrolling problem G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) with T = U and a well formed
signature S , there exists a characteristic digraph MS depending only on S and computable in polynomial
time, such that E is sufficiently connected if, and only if, (U, E) contains a subdigraph isomorphic (respecting
the attack lengths) to MS . From this we immediately obtain that the problem whether a given E is sufficiently
connected is in NP, and we also provide the matching lower bound. Note that the characteristic digraph can
be used to synthesize a minimal sufficiently connected environment for solving a given patrolling problem.
Related work. Two player zero-sum stochastic games with both perfect and imperfect information have
been studied very intensively in recent years (see, e.g., [11, 19, 18]), also for games with infinite state-space
[10, 16, 15, 2]. Patrolling games have so far been considered mainly in the context of operation research.
Here, the emphasis is usually put on finding methods allowing to synthesize a sufficiently good defender’s
strategy, and the basic theoretical questions related to the underlying formal model are usually not studied
in greater detail. The problem of finding locally optimal strategies for robotic patrolling units have been
studied either in restricted environments (e.g., on circles in [3, 4]), or fully-connected environments with
weighted preference on the targets [6, 7]. Some novel aspects of the problem, such as variants with moving
targets [9, 17], multiple patrolling units [8], or movement of the attacker on the graph [7] and reaction to
alarms [23] have also been considered in recent works.
2 The results
We assume familiarity with the notions introduced earlier in Section 1.
2.1 The existence of an optimal defender’s strategy
We start by proving that there exists an optimal strategy for the defender. This is a generalization of similar
results recently achieved in [1] for a special type of patrolling games where all nodes share the same attack
length (i.e., supp(S ) is a singleton). The proof technique is completely different.
Theorem 2.1. For every patrolling problem G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d), there exists an optimal defender’s strategy.
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Proof Sketch. We construct an optimal strategy σ∗ as a point-wise limit of a sequence σ1, σ2, . . . of strate-
gies where each σk is 1/k-optimal. More precisely, we select σ1, σ2, . . . in such a way that for each history
h, the sequence of distributions σ1(h), σ2(h), . . . converges to a probability distribution, and we define σ∗(h)
to be its limit (we obtain σ1, σ2, . . . by starting with an arbitrary sequence of 1/k-optimal strategies and suc-
cessively filtering subsequences that are convergent on individual histories). It is relatively straightforward
to show that if val(σ∗) ≤ val − δ for some δ > 0, then for all k’s large enough we have val(σk) ≤ val − δ/2,
which contradicts the fact that each σk is 1/k-optimal. For details see Appendix B. 
2.2 Computing finite-memory ε-optimal strategies
In this subsection we describe a generic algorithm which for a given patrolling problem computes a finite
representation of an ε-optimal strategy. Let us start with the definition of a finite-memory strategy.
Definition 2.2. A finite-memory defender’s strategy is a tuple (M, N,m0, ξ) where M is a finite set of memory
elements, N : M×U → M assigns to every memory element m ∈ M and a node u ∈ U a next memory element
N(m, u), m0 is an initial memory element, and ξ : M × U → ∆(U) is a function which to every memory
element m ∈ M and a node u ∈ U assigns a distribution ξ(m, u) on U such that supp(ξ(m, u)) ⊆ succ(u).
A finite-memory defender’s strategy (M, N,m0, ξ) induces a defender’s strategy σ as follows: We extend
N to an "empty" history ε by N(m0, ε) = m0, and to all histories hv ∈ H , here v ∈ U, inductively by
N(m0, hv) = N(N(m0, h), v). Then for hu ∈ H (where u ∈ U) we have that σ(hu) = ξ(N(m0, h), u).
Theorem 2.3. Let ε > 0 and assume that uˆ ∈ T. There is an ε-optimal finite-memory defender’s strategy
computable in time (
ˆd · |U |
ε
)O( ˆd2·|U |2)
.
We construct our strategy using the so-called characteristics (some intuition is given below).
Definition 2.4. A characteristic c is a triple (r, s, c) where r ∈ U, s is a probability distribution on U, and
c : {2, . . . , ˆd} × T → [0, 1]. Denote by Char the set of all characteristics. Given c = (r, s, c) ∈ Char, we
denote by val(c) the value minu∈T c(d(u), u) of c.
Given a characteristic c, we use cr, cs, cc to denote the three components of c = (r, s, c), respectively.
Intuitively, we interpret a given characteristic c as a "local" plan of defence for next ˆd steps where
• cr is the current node,
• cs is the current assignment of probabilities to the successors of cr, and
• for every 2 ≤ k ≤ ˆd and every u ∈ T , we interpret cc(k, u) as the probability of visiting u in at least one,
and at most k steps from cr. 1
To simplify our notation, we denote by cc(1, u) the probability cs(u) for every u ∈ T .
Now assume that the current plan is formalized by a characteristic c, and suppose that the defender
makes one step to a next vertex v chosen randomly with probability cs(v). Now the defender declares a
new plan, cv ∈ Char where cvr = v. However, the crucial observation is that the new plans (cv)v∈U must be
consistent with the original plan c in the following sense for all 2 ≤ k ≤ ˆd and all u ∈ T :
cc(k, u) = cs(u) +
∑
v,u
cs(v) · cvc(k − 1, u)
1Note that many characteristics are not “consistent” (if e.g. cs(u) = 1/2 and cc(1, u) = 1/4). But later we make sure that only
consistent characteristics are used.
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We say that such a vector (cv)v∈U ∈ CharU of characteristics is a successor of c.
Now let C be a finite set of characteristics such that every c ∈ C has a successor (cv)v∈U ∈ CU (i.e.,
cv ∈ C for all v ∈ U), and there is at least one cˆ ∈ C such that cˆr = uˆ. We say that such C is closed.
We construct a finite-memory strategy (M, N,m0, ξ) where M = C, N(c, v) = cv, m0 = cˆ, and ξ(c) = cs.
Intuitively, the strategy follows the plans in C and always proceeds to the next plan according to a fixed
successor in CU . We prove that this strategy works consistently with the characteristics of C, i.e., whenever
the current history is h and the current memory element is c, then, subsequently, the probability of reaching
u in at least one, and at most k steps is equal to cs(k, u). Thus the value of the finite-memory strategy cannot
be worse than minc∈C val(c).
So, the computation of a finite-memory strategy reduces to a computation of a finite closed set of char-
acteristics. We show that one such set can be extracted from a carefully selected ε-optimal strategy. Given
a defender’s strategy σ, we denote by H(σ) the set of all histories that σ may follow with a positive prob-
ability. Given a strategy σ and a history h ∈ H(σ), we define a characteristic c[σ, h] such that c[h]r is
the last node of h, c[h]s = σ(h), and each c[h]c(k, u) is the probability of reaching u in at least one, and at
most k steps starting with the history h using σ. Now let σ∗ be an optimal strategy. The crucial observation
(see also Proposition C.1 in Appendix C) is that for every h ∈ H(σ) it holds that val(c[σ∗, h]) ≥ val. By
appropriately rounding probabilities in σ∗, we obtain an ε-optimal strategy σε such that for every history h
and every u ∈ U :
σε(h)(u) = k · ⌈ ˆd · |U |/ε⌉−1 for a suitable k ∈ N
and c[σε, h] ≥ val − ε for all h ∈ H(σε).
Now it is rather straightforward to show that for each h, the vector (c[hv])v∈U is a successor of c[h].
Thus the set Char[σε] of all c[h], here h ∈ H , is a closed set. It is also finite, of size that is bounded by(
ˆd · |U |/ε
)O( ˆd2·|U |)
, and every c ∈ Char[σε] satisfies val(c) ≥ val − ε. This shows that there always exists a
ε-optimal finite-memory strategy of the size bounded by
(
ˆd · |U |/ε
)O( ˆd2·|U |)
.
Our algorithm computes a closed subset C of a (finite) set of appropriately rounded characteristics that
maximizes minc∈C val(c). This is done by a simple iterative procedure which maintains a growing pool of
characteristics (in order of decreasing value) and tries to find its closed subset. For details see Appendix C.
2.3 A bound on the Stackelberg value
Now we establish an upper bound on val which depends only on the attack signature S of G. The simplicity
of the argument is due to Proposition D.1.
Theorem 2.5. For every patrolling problem G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) such that T = U, we have that
val ≤
(∑
k∈supp(S )
S (k)
k
)−1
where S is the attack signature of G.
Proof Sketch. Intuitivelly, every node u has to be visited by the defender with propability at least val during
each d(u) consecutive steps. Hence, summing the probabilities of visiting u in each of the steps from 1 to
ℓ = Πk∈supp(S ) k we need to reach a value greater than or equal to val · ℓ/d(u). Summing these values for
all nodes we have at least ∑u∈U val · ℓ/d(u). Note that in each step we visit some node with probability one
and so, the sum for all nodes and ℓ steps is just ℓ. This implies the theorem due to ℓ ≥ ∑u∈U val · ℓ/d(u) =
ℓ · val ·∑k∈supp(S ) S (k)/k. For more details see Appendix D. 
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2.4 Solving patrolling problems with a fully connected environment
Let G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) be a patrolling problem where T = U and E = U × U, and let S be the signature
of G. Recall the notion of modular strategy and the associated decomposition principle introduced in Sec-
tion 1. In particular, recall that a d-modular strategy σ for G is fully represented by probability distributions
µ0, . . . , µd−1 over U such that σ(h) = µi where i = |h| mod d.
We start by considering the case when G has n nodes with the same attack length d. Since we aim at
developing a strategy synthesis algorithm polynomial in ||S ||, we need to invent a compact representation
of modular strategies which is sufficiently expressive for our purposes. We assume that the nodes of U are
indexed by numbers from 1 to |U |, and we use U〈i, N〉 to denote the subset of U consisting of N subsequent
nodes starting from i, i.e., all uℓ where i ≤ ℓ < i + N and 1 ≤ i ≤ i + N − 1 ≤ |U |. Let us consider the class
of expressions determined by the following abstract syntax equation:
θ ::= Circle(U〈i, N〉, M, L) | θ1; θ2 | νp[θ1, θ2]
Here, M, L ∈ N such that M divides N, and p ranges over a countable set of variables Var. Assuming some
valuation α : Var → [0, 1], every expression θ determines a modular strategy for U defined inductively
as follows: Circle(U〈i, N〉, M, L) is a modular strategy which splits U〈i, N〉 into pairwise disjoint subsets
of size M and then “walks around” these sets L times, θ1; θ2 is a modular strategy which “sequentially
alternates” between θ1 and θ2, and νp[θ1, θ2] is a strategy which “composes” θ1 and θ2 using the distribution
(1 − α(p), α(p)). A detailed description of the semantics is given in Appendix E.
Our strategy synthesis algorithm is a recursive procedure Defend which inputs a triple (U〈i, N〉, D, e),
where U〈i, N〉 is the set of nodes to be defended, D is the number of steps available for defending U〈i, N〉,
and e is an expression which represents the “weight” of the constructed defending strategy in the final
distribution ν. The procedure outputs a pair (θ,V) where θ is an expression specifying a D-modular strategy
for U〈i, N〉, and V is an arithmetic expression representing the guaranteed “coverage” of the targets in
U〈i, N〉 when using θ with the weight e. As a side effect, the function Defend may produce equations for
the variables that are employed in symbolic strategy compositions of the form νp[θ1, θ2]. The algorithm is
invoked by Defend(U〈1, |U |〉, d, 1), and the system of equations is initially empty. The recursion is stopped
when D divides N or N divides D, and in these cases Defend provably produces strategies that achieve the
best coverage for every value of e. In the other cases, Defend proceeds recursively by splitting either the
set of nodes or the number of steps available to protect the nodes. In both cases, Defend tries to exploit the
available resources in the best possible way. A full description is given in Appendix E. At the very end,
we obtain a d-modular strategy σ for G specified by an expression θ whose size is polynomial in ||S ||, an
expression V which represents val(σ), and we also obtain a system of polynomial equations for the variables
which parameterize θ and V . The system has a unique solution in [0, 1]k (where k is the number of variables)
that corresponds to the intended valuation. The size of k can be, for given n > d, computed as follows: we put
n0 = n and d0 = d, and then ni+1 = ni mod di and di+1 = di mod ni+1. The number of variables for n and d is
equal to the least index j such that d j divides n j. In particular, if d divides n, there is no variable at all, and our
algorithm immediately produces a strategy which achieves the value d/n, which is optimal by Theorem 2.5.
As an example of a “hard” instance, consider n = 709793170386861531 and d = 37248973638339152,
which requires 30 variables and equations. The solution (producing val(σ) = 0.05247471678) can be
computed by Maple in fractions of a second. It has been recently proved by Lamser [22] that our algorithm
produces na optimal strategy also when d = 2 (for arbitrary n), which includes the example of Fig. 1 (left).
Since the algorithm seems to exploit the available resources optimally, we conjecture that it actually outputs
an optimal strategy for all parameters.
To solve a patrolling problem with a general signature S , we simply split the nodes into disjoint subsets
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according to their attack lengths, solve these subproblems by the above algorithm, and then compose the
modular strategies so that all nodes are defended equally well. One can easily check that if S is well formed,
this leads to a strategy whose value matches the bound of Theorem 2.5. Thus, we obtain the following:
Theorem 2.6. Let G be a patrolling problem with T = U, a fully connected environment, and a well formed
signature S . Then there is an optimal modular strategy σ computable in time polynomial in ||S ||.
2.5 A characterization of sufficiently connected environments
For the rest of this subsection, we fix a patrolling problem G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) with T = U and a well-formed
signature S . We classify the conditions under which E is sufficiently connected (recall that E is sufficiently
connected iff the value for G is the same as the value for G when E is replaced with the fully connected
environment U × U. Let MS be a digraph with vertex labelling d constructed as follows:
• For all k ∈ supp(S ), i ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, and j ∈ {1, . . . , S (k)/k}, we add a fresh vertex vk[i, j] and set
d(vk[i, j]) := k. Hence, MS has exactly ∑k∈supp(S ) S (k) vertices.
• For every pair of vertices vk[i, j] and vk′ [i′, j′], there is an arc from vk[i, j] to vk′[i′, j′] in MS iff there is
some 0 ≤ ℓ < k · k′ such that i = ℓmod k and i′ = (ℓ+1) mod k′.
Note that MS is computable in polynomial time. We prove the following:
Theorem 2.7. Let G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) be a patrolling problem such that T = U and the signature S of G
is well formed. Then E is sufficiently connected iff (U, E) contains a subdigraph H which is d-preserving
isomorphic to Ms (i.e., if x of H is mapped to y of MS then d(x) = d(y)).
The “if” part of Theorem 2.7 is trivial, because if (U, E) contains a subdigraph Ms, then we can implement
the optimal modular strategy constructed by the algorithm of Subsection 2.4. The “only if” part is more
challenging. The crucial observation is that the defender is not allowed to visit any target u twice within
d(u) steps whenever she is aiming to reach the bound of Theorem 2.5. The underlying observations also
reveals that every optimal strategy σ starts to behave like the strategy σ∗ after every history which visits
all nodes. Hence, the strategy σ∗ does not belong to ⋃∞j=1 Σ j, except for some trivial cases (see Section 1).
A proof of Theorem 2.7 is given in Appendix F. An immediate consequence of Theorem 2.7 is that the
problem whether a environment E is sufficiently connected is in NP. We complement this by a matching
lower bound in the following theorem with a full proof in Appendix G.
Theorem 2.8. The problem whether the environment of a given patrolling problem G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d)), such
that T = U and the signature S of G is well formed, is sufficiently connected, is NP-complete. Further, this
problem is NP-complete even for a subclass of patrolling problems such that supp(S ) = {k}, where k ≥ 3
is a fixed constant. For a subclass of patrolling problems where supp(S ) = {2}, the problem is solvable in
polynomial time.
3 Open problems
Our proof of the existence of an optimal defender’s strategy (Theorem 2.1) does not allow to conclude
anything about the structure of optimal strategies. One is tempted to expect that optimal strategies are in
some sense “regular” and require only finite-memory, but our present understanding does not allow to prove
this conjecture. Another challenge it to lift the presented compositional technique to a more general class
of patrolling games (such results would have a considerable practical impact). Finally, the question whether
the algorithm of Section 2.4 produces an optimal strategy for all inputs is also interesting but left open.
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A Detailed definitions for appendices
We use N and N0 to denote the sets of positive and non-negative integers, respectively. The sets of all finite
and infinite words over a given alphabet Γ are denoted by Γ∗ and Γω, respectively. We write ε for the empty
word. The length of a given w ∈ Γ∗ ∪ Γω is denoted by |w|, where the length of an infinite word is ∞. We
denote by Γ≤k the set of all words w ∈ Γ∗ satisfying |w| ≤ k. The last letter of a finite non-empty word w
is denoted by last(w). Given a (finite or infinite) word w over Γ, the individual letters of w are denoted by
w0w1 · · · . Given two words w,w′ ∈ Γ∗ ∪ Γω we write w  w′ whenever w is a prefix of w′, i.e., whenever
there exists a word w′′ ∈ Γ∗ ∪ Γω such that w′ = ww′′. Further, we write w ≺ w′ whenever w  w′ and
w , w′.
Given a finite or countably infinite set A, a probability distribution over A is a function δ : A → [0, 1]
such that
∑
a∈supp(δ) δ(a) = 1. The support of δ is the set supp(δ) = {a ∈ A | δ(a) , 0}. We use ∆(A) to denote
the set of all distributions over A. A distribution δ ∈ ∆(A) is positive if δ(a) > 0 for every a ∈ A, and rational
if δ(a) is rational for every a ∈ A.
Definition A.1. A patrolling problem is a triple G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) where U is a finite set of nodes, T ⊆ U
is a set of targets, uˆ ∈ T is the initial target, E ⊆ U × U is an environment, and d : T → N assigns to each
target the associated attack length. The attack signature of G is a function S : N → N0 where S(k) is the
cardinality of {u ∈ U | d(u) = k}. We use supp(S ) to denote the set {k ∈ N | S (k) , 0}. We say that S is well
formed if k divides S (k) for every k ∈ N. By ˆd we denote maxu∈U{d(u)}.
Let G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) be a patrolling problem. We say that E is fully connected if E = U ×U. Given a node
u ∈ U, we denote by succ(u) the set {u′ ∈ U | (u, u′) ∈ E} of all successors of u. A path is a finite or infinite
word w ∈ U∗ ∪Uω such that (wi,wi+1) ∈ E for every 0 ≤ i < |w|. A history is a finite non-empty path, and a
run is an infinite path. The sets of all histories and runs are denoted by H and R, respectively. Given a set
of histories H ⊆ H , we use R(H) to denote the set of all runs ω such that w  ω for some w ∈ H (when
H = {h}, we write R(h) instead of R({h})).
Definition A.2. A defender’s strategy is a function σ : H → ∆(U) such that supp(σ(h)) ⊆ succ(last(h)) for
every h ∈ H . The set of all defender’s strategies is denoted by Σ.
An attacker’s strategy is a function π : H → T ∪ {⊥} such that whenever π(h) , ⊥, then for all h′ ≺ h
we have that π(h′) = ⊥. We denote by Π the set of all attacker’s strategies.
Intuitively, given a history h, the defender chooses the next node randomly according to the distribution
σ(h), and the attacker either attacks a node u ∈ T (π(h) = u), or waits (π(h) = ⊥). Note that the attacker
can choose to attack only once during a play, and also note that he cannot randomize. This is because
randomization does not help the attacker to decrease the Stackelberg value, and hence we can safely adopt
this restriction from the very beginning.
For a given strategy σ ∈ Σ, we define the set H(σ) ⊆ H of relevant histories, consisting of all h ∈ H
such that for all h′ ∈ H and u ∈ U where h′u  h we have that σ(h′)(u) > 0. Note that a defender’s strategy
σ determines a unique probability space over all infinite paths initiated in a given u ∈ U in the standard way
(see, e.g., [12]), and we use Pσu to denote the associated probability measure.
Given an attacker’s strategy π, we say that a run w contains a successful attack if there exist a finite
prefix h of w and a node u ∈ T such that π(h) = u and u is not among the first d nodes visited by w after the
prefix h. For every node u ∈ U, we use Du[π] to denote the set of all defended runs initiated in u that do not
contain a successful attack. Hence, Pσu (Du[π]) is the probability of all runs initiated in u that are defended
when the defender uses the strategy σ and the attacker uses the strategy π. We omit the subscript u in Pσu
and Du[π] when u = uˆ.
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Definition A.3. For all u ∈ U and σ ∈ Σ, we denote by valu(σ) the value of σ defined by valu(σ) =
infπ∈ΠPσu (Du[π]). The Stackelberg value of u is defined as valu = supσ∈Σ valu(σ). A defender’s strategy σ∗
is optimal in u if valu(σ∗) = valu. The value of uˆ is denoted by val, and a strategy which is optimal in uˆ is
called just optimal.
At some places, we consider strategies obtained by “forgetting” some initial prefix of the history. For-
mally, for all h ∈ H and a strategy θ of the defender/attacker, we define a strategy θh by θh(uh′) = θ(hh′) for
every u ∈ U and h′ ∈ H. Note that σh behaves similarly for all initial nodes. We are typically interested in
its behavior starting in last(h), which corresponds to behavior of σ when started at h.
In what follows, we also use the notion of an immediate attack value. Given a defender’s strategy σ, a
history h ∈ H(σ), and a node u ∈ U, we define att-valh(σ, u) to be the probability of reaching u from last(h)
in at least one and at most d(u) steps using the strategy σh. Intuitively, att-valh(σ, u) is the probability of
defending u assuming that the attack on u starts after the history h, i.e., π(h) = u. It is easy to see that
Pσ(D[π]) =
∑
h∈H(σ)
π(h),⊥
Pσ(h) · att-valh(σ, π(h))
B The existence of an optimal defender’s strategy
Theorem 2.1. For every patrolling problem G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) there exists an optimal defender’s strategy.
Proof. We construct an optimal strategy σ∗ as a point-wise limit of a sequence σ1, σ2, . . . of strategies where
each σk is 1/k-optimal. More precisely, we prove the following.
Claim : There is a sequence of defender’s strategies σ1, σ2, . . . and a defender’s strategy σ∗ such that
• each σi is 1/i-optimal, i.e., val(σi) ≥ val − 1/i,
• for every h ∈ H(σ) and every u ∈ U we have that limi→∞ σi(h)(u) = σ∗(h)(u). (In particular, the limit
exists for every h and u.)
Proof: Assume a lexicographical ordering  on histories of H . To simplify our notation, we consider an
"empty" history ǫ such that ǫ  h for every h ∈ H . We consider histories h successively according to  and
inductively define sequences σh,1, σh,2, . . . of defender’s strategies so that the following holds:
A. each σh,i is 1/i-optimal,
B. σh,1, σh,2, . . . is a subsequence of all preceding sequences σh′,1, σh′,2, . . . for h′  h,
C. for every h′  h the sequence of distributions σh,1(h′), σh,2(h′), . . . converges (point-wisely) to a proba-
bility distribution.
Then it suffices to put σi = σh,|h| where h is the i-th history according to , and to define σ∗(h) =
limi→∞ σi(h).
We define σh,i as follows:
• For every i ∈ N, we define σǫ,i to be an arbitrary 1/i-optimal strategy.
• Assume that σh′,1, σh′,2, . . . has already been defined for h′. Consider a next history h according to .
As the space of all probability distributions on U is compact, there exists a subsequence σh,1, σh,2, . . . of
σh
′,1, σh
′,2, . . . such that σh,i(h) converges (point-wisely) to a probability distribution on U.
The sequences apparently satisfy the above conditions A, B, C. 
We prove that the defender’s strategy σ∗ obtained in the above Claim is optimal. Suppose that σ∗ is not
optimal, i.e. val(σ∗) ≤ val − δ for some δ > 0. Then there is an attacker’s strategy π such that Pσ∗ (D[π]) ≤
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val − δ/2. For every i ∈ N, let πi behave as π on runs where π attacks before i-th step, and do not attack at
all on the rest.
Claim : limi→∞ Pσ∗ (D[πi]) = Pσ∗(D[π])
Proof: Note that
Pσ∗(D[π]) =
∑
h∈H(σ∗)
π(h),⊥
Pσ∗(h) · att-valh(σ∗, π(h))
=
∑
h∈H(σ∗)
π(h),⊥
|h|≤i
Pσ∗(h) · att-valh(σ∗, π(h)) +
∑
h∈H(σ∗)
π(h),⊥
|h|>i
Pσ∗ (h) · att-valh(σ∗, π(h))
= Pσ∗(D[π]) + pi
where pi is the probability that the the attacker starts his attack after i. Clearly, pi → ∞ as i → ∞, which
proves the claim. 
Thus for a sufficiently large i we have that Pσ∗(D[πi]) ≤ val − δ/4. Now observe that for all sufficiently
large k ∈ N we have |Pσ∗ (D[πi]) − Pσk (D[πi])| ≤ δ/8 because the transition probabilities determined by σ∗
and σk on the first i + ˆd steps are getting closer and closer with growing k. However, then we obtain that
Pσk (D[πi])| ≤ val − δ/8, which means that σk cannot be 1/k-optimal for large k. 
Proposition B.2. Assume that uˆ is a target. There every optimal defender’s strategy σ∗ satisfies
inf
h∈H(σ∗)
min
u∈T
att-valh(σ∗, u) ≥ val (1)
Proof. Recall that we denote by valu and valu(σ) the values of G and of σ, resp., when u is used as the initial
node instead of uˆ. It suffices to prove Proposition B.2 under the assumption that val = valuˆ = maxu∈T valu,
because then we obtain, as a consequence, that valu = valuˆ for all u ∈ T . Indeed, using σ∗, every target
node has to be visited. So given u ∈ T , there is a history h ∈ H(σ∗) such that u = last(h). However, note
that (1) holds also for σ∗h instead of σ∗, and thus valu(σ∗h) ≥ val. As valuˆ = val is maximal, we obtain that
valu = valuˆ.
So assume that val = valuˆ = maxu∈T valu. Let σ∗ be an optimal strategy. Note that val = maxu∈T valu
implies vallast(h)(σ∗h) ≤ val for every history h ∈ H(σ) such that last(h) ∈ T . We obtain that vallast(h)(σh) ≤
val for every history h ∈ H(σ) because even if last(h) is not a target, σh starting in last(h) must visit a target
almost surely and the attacker may wait until it happens.
We claim that σ∗ satisfies (1), i.e. that att-valh(σ∗, u) ≥ val for all h ∈ H(σ∗) and all u ∈ T . Indeed,
assume that att-val
¯h(σ∗, u) ≤ val − δ for some δ > 0 and ¯h ∈ H(σ∗) and u ∈ U. Assume, w.l.o.g., that σ∗
follows the history ¯h with probability at least δ.
Note that due to vallast(h)(σ∗h) ≤ val for every h, the deficiency of σ∗ at ¯h cannot be compensated on
other histories. We obtain the following: Let A be the set of all histories h′ of length |h| (i.e., in particular,
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h ∈ A). Then
val(σ∗) ≤
∑
h′∈A
Pσ∗(h′) · vallast(h′)(σ∗h′)
= Pσ∗(h) · vallast(h)(σ∗h) +
∑
h′∈Ar{h}
Pσ∗(h′) · vallast(h′)(σ∗h′)
≤ Pσ∗(h) · vallast(h)(σ∗h) +
∑
h′∈Ar{h}
Pσ∗(h′) · val
≤ Pσ∗(h) · min
u∈U
att-valh(σ∗, u) +
∑
h′∈Ar{h}
Pσ∗(h′) · val
≤ Pσ∗(h) · (val − δ) +
∑
h′∈Ar{h}
Pσ∗ (h′) · val
= val − Pσ∗ (h) · δ
≤ val − δ2
This contradicts the fact that σ∗ is optimal.

C Computing finite-memory ε-optimal strategies
C.1 Proposition C.1
Let us fix a patrolling problem G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d).
Proposition C.1. Given ε > 0, there is an ε-optimal strategy σε such that for every history h and every
u ∈ U it holds
σε(h)(u) = k · ⌈(|U | ˆd)/ε⌉−1 for a suitable k ∈ N
and
min
u∈U
att-valh(σε, u) ≥ val − ε.
Proof. Let σ be an optimal strategy. Let U = {u1, u2, . . . , u|U |} be the set of nodes of G and define s =
⌈(|U | ˆd)/ε⌉−1.
For every history h and every 1 ≤ i ≤ |U |, we inductively define σε(h)(ui) = ki · s, where ki is the largest
number satisfying
ki · s ≤ σ(h)(ui) +
i−1∑
j=1
(σ(h)(u j) − σε(h)(u j)) .
This rounding procedure guarantees that σε(h) is indeed a probability distribution over U, i.e.∑
u∈U σε(h)(u) = 1 (note that simple rounding would not guarantee this property). Further, when we re-
alize the invariant 0 ≤ ∑i−1j=1(σ(h)(u j) − σε(h)(u j)) < s holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |U |, it is easy to see that
|σ(h)(ui) − σε(h)(ui)| < s, which is captured by the following claim.
Claim A: |σ(h)(u) − σε(h)(u)| < s for every u ∈ U.
It follows from the definition of σε that whenever σ(h)(u) = 0, then also σε(h)(u) = 0. This means that
any history executable using σε is also executable using σ, i.e. H(σε) ⊆ H(σ).
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Now, knowing that att-valh(σ) is defined if att-valh(σε) is defined, we prove the following:
att-valh(σε) ≥ att-valh(σ) − ǫ (2)
≥ vallast(h)(σh) − ǫ (3)
≥ val(σ) − ǫ . (4)
• The inequality (4) directly follows from Proposition B.2 as h ∈ H(σ).
• The inequality (3) clearly holds as forcing the attacker to attack immediately cannot decrease the value
of the game.
• To prove the first inequality (2), we have to analyze the impact of the rounding in the definition of σε.
Denote by R[ι, h, t, k] the probability of reaching t ∈ T from last(h), h ∈ H , in up to k steps using the
strategy ιh.
We prove by induction on k that for all h ∈ H , t ∈ T , and k ∈ N we have that
R[σ, h, t, k] − R[σε, h, t, k] ≤ k|U |s .
The base case (k = 1) directly follows from Claim A for all u ∈ U and the fact that R[ι, h, t, 1] = ι(h)(t)
for every defender’s strategy ι.
Let us denote the difference R[σ, h, t, k] − R[σε, h, t, k] by ∆. For k ≥ 2, we have
∆ = σ(h)(t) +
∑
u∈Ur{t}
σ(h)(u) · R[σ, hu, t, k − 1] − (5)
− σε(h)(t) −
∑
u∈Ur{t}
σε(h)(u) · R[σε, hu, t, k − 1]
≤ s +
∑
u∈Ur{t}
(R[σ, hu, t, k − 1] · (σ(h)(u) − σε(h)(u)) + (6)
+ σε(h)(u) · (R[σ, hu, t, k − 1] − R[σε, hu, t, k − 1]))
≤ s +
∑
u∈Ur{t}
R[σ, hu, t, k − 1] · s + (7)
+
∑
u∈Ur{t}
σε(h)(u) · (k − 1)|U |s
≤ s + (|U | − 1)s + (k − 1)|U |s (8)
= k|U |s .
– The equality (5) follows from the definition of R[ι, h, t, k] as R[ι, h, t, k] = ι(h)(t) + ∑u∈Ur{t} ι(h)(u) ·
R[ι, hu, t, k − 1] for all k ≥ 2.
– The equality (6) is just an application of Claim A and of the formula ab−a′b′ = b(a−a′)+a′(b−b′).
– The inequality (7) follows from Claim A and from the induction hypothesis.
– The inequality (8) holds because R[σ, hu, t, k − 1] ≤ 1 and ∑u∈Ur{t} σε(h)(u) ≤ 1.
So we have that R[σ, h, t, d(t)] − R[σε, h, t, d(t)] ≤ d|U |s. However, note that
att-valh(ι) = inf
t∈T
R[ι, h, t, d(t)]
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and therefore
att-valh(σ) − att-valh(σε) ≤ ˆd|U |s ≤ ǫ .

C.2 Formal proof of Theorem 2.3
In order to make lengthy computations more succinct, we use the following shorthand notation: Given
a characteristic c = (r, s, c) ∈ Char, we define:
• c(0, u) = 1 if u = cr, and c(0, u) = 0 for all u , cr.
• c(1, u) = cs(u) for all u ∈ U.
• c(k, u) = cc(k, u) for all 2 ≤ k ≤ ˆd and u ∈ T .
Also, we use functional notation to denote vectors of characteristics (i.e. successors). That is we represent
each (cv)v∈U ∈ CharU as a function ζ : U → Char where ζ(v) = cv for every v ∈ U.
Let us formally define the notion of successor of a characteristic. We say that ζ : U → Char is
a successor of c ∈ Char if for every v ∈ U holds ζ(v)(0, v) = 1, and for every u ∈ T and 2 ≤ k ≤ ˆd holds
c(k, u) = c(1, u) +
∑
v,u
c(1, v) · ζ(v)(k − 1, u)
A set of characteristics B ⊆ C is closed if there is at least one c ∈ B satisfying c(0, uˆ) = 1, and every c ∈ B
has a successor ζ : U → B.
Given a defender’s strategy σ and a history h, we denote by c[σ, h] the characteristic defined as follows:
c[σ, h](last(h)) = 1, and c[σ, h](1, u) = σ(h)(u) for every u ∈ U, and for every 2 ≤ k ≤ ˆd and u ∈ T we
define
c[σ, h](k, u) = Pσ(R({hh′ | last(h′) = u, 1 ≤ |h′| ≤ k}) | R(h))
(Intuitively, for k ≥ 1, the value c[σ, h](k, u) is the probability of reaching u in at least one and at most k
steps starting with the history h and using σ.) Denote by Char[σ] the set of all characteristics c[σ, h] where
h ∈ H(σ).
Lemma C.2. Given a defender’s strategy σ, the set Char[σ] is closed.
Proof. By definition, c[σ, uˆ](0, uˆ) = 1. Now consider c[σ, h] ∈ Char[σ]. Let ξ(v) = c[σ, hv]. Apparently,
ξ(v) ∈ Char[σ] so it suffices to show that ξ is a successor of c[σ, h]. By definition,
ξ(v)(0, v) = c[σ, hv](0, v) = 1
and, clearly,
c[σ, h](k, u) = c[σ, h](1, u) +
∑
v,u
c[σ, h](1, v) · c[σ, hv](k − 1, u)
= c[σ, h](1, u) +
∑
v,u
c[σ, h](1, v) · ξ(v)(k − 1, u)
which means that ξ is a successor of c[σ, h]. 
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Let C be a finite closed subset of Char. We say that a finite-memory strategy σ = (M, N,m0, ξ) is consistent
with C if
• M = C,
• for every c ∈ C the function K(c) defined by
K(c)(u) = N(c, u) for all u ∈ U
is a successor of c.
• m0 = cˆ for some cˆ ∈ C satisfying cˆ(0, uˆ) = 1,
• ξ(c, u) = c(1, u) for all u ∈ U.
Proposition C.3. Let C be a finite closed set of characteristics and assume that σ is consistent with C. Then
val(σ) ≥ minc∈C val(c).
Proof. Let us first prove that c[σ, h] ∈ C for every history h ∈ H(σ). Let us fix a history h. We prove
that c[σ, h] = N(cˆ, h), i.e. that c[σ, h](k, u) = N(cˆ, h)(k, u) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ ˆd. It is easy to show that
N(cˆ, h)(0, last(h)) = 1. For k > 0 we proceed by induction on k. Immediately from definitions we obtain
that for every u ∈ U
c[σ, h](1, u) = σ(h)(u) = ξ(N(cˆ, h), u) = N(cˆ, h)(1, u)
Now consider 2 ≤ k ≤ ˆd. We have
c[σ, h](k, u) = c[σ, h](1, v) +
∑
v,u
c[σ, h](1, v) · c[σ, hv](k − 1, u)
= N(cˆ, h)(1, u) +
∑
v=u
N(cˆ, h)(1, v) · N(cˆ, hv)(k − 1, u)
= N(cˆ, h)(1, u) +
∑
v=u
N(cˆ, h)(1, v) · N(N(cˆ, h), v′)(k − 1, u)
= N(cˆ, h)(1, u) +
∑
v=u
N(cˆ, h)(1, v) · K(N(cˆ, h))(v′)(k − 1, u)
= N(cˆ, h)(k, u)
Here the second equality follows by induction, the last equality follows from the fact that K(N(cˆ, h)) is a
successor of N(cˆ, h). This proves that c[σ, h] ∈ C for every history h ∈ H(σ).
Now since every defender’s strategy σ satisfies
att-valh(σ, u) = c[σ, h](d(u), u)
we obtain
val(σ) = inf
π
Pσuˆ (D[π])
= inf
π
∑
h∈H(σ),π(h)∈U
P(R(h)) · att-valh(σ, π(h))
= inf
π
∑
h∈H(σ),π(h)∈U
P(R(h)) · c[σ, h](d(π(h)), π(h))
≥ inf
π
∑
h∈H(σ),π(h)∈U
P(R(h)) · min
c∈C
val(c)
= min
c∈C
val(c)

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Let Charε be the set of all characteristics c such that c(k, u) is an integer multiple of sk, here s = ⌈|U |d/ε⌉−1,
for every 1 ≤ k ≤ ˆd and every u ∈ U.
Lemma C.4. The set Charε contains a (finite) closed subset C such that minc∈C val(c) ≥ val − ε.
Proof. It suffices to consider σε of Proposition C.1. Then Char[σε] ⊆ Charε is a closed subset. 
Given any closed subset C of Charε satisfying minc∈C val(c) ≥ val − ε, we obtain, via Proposition C.3, a
finite-memory ε-optimal strategy. So it remains to give an algorithm for computing such a closed subset C.
The Algorithm
The following procedure computes a closed subset C of Charε which maximizes minc∈C val(c) among all
closed subsets of Charε (so in particular, satisfies the desired bound minc∈C val(c) ≥ val − ε).
Let c1, . . . , cn be all characteristics of Charε ordered in such a way that for arbitrary ci, c j we have that
val(ci) ≤ val(c j) implies i ≤ j. The following procedure maintains the invariant that A = {c1, . . . , ck} for
some k ≥ 0 and computes the desired closed set C :
1. Initialize A := {c1}.
2. Compute a closed subset of A, or indicate that A does not contain a closed subset as follows:
a. Initialize B := A,
b. compute B′ as the set of all c ∈ B that have successors in B,
c. depending on B′ do:
* if either B′ = ∅, or there is no c ∈ B′ such that c(0, uˆ) = 1, then indicate that there is no closed
subset of A (and proceed to 3.),
* else, if B = B′, then return B as a closed subset of A (and proceed to 3.),
* else assign B := B′ and go to b.
3. If A = {c1, . . . , ck} does not contain a closed subset, then add ck+1 to A and go to 2., else return the closed
subset as a result.
Correctness
In step 2., the algorithm computes the greatest closed subset of A using a straightforward iterative algorithm.
As the characteristics are added to A in the order of non-decreasing value and there exists a closed subset C of
Charε satisfying minc∈C val(c) ≥ val−ε (due to Lemma C.4), a subset C′ satisfying minc∈C′ val(c) ≥ val−ε
is computed when C ⊆ A for the first time.
Complexity
Let us denote by Θ the size of Charε. It is straightforward to show that Θ ∈
(
|U | ˆd
ε
)O(|U | ˆd2)
. Now the
computation in step 2. b. takes time in ΘO(|U |) (for every characteristic of B one has to check all possible
successors, i.e. vectors of the form ζ : U → B). The whole algorithm iterates at most Θ times through 1. –
3. (a characteristic is added to A in every iteration except the last one). So the total complexity is at most
ΘO(|U |) =
( |U | ˆd
ε
)O(|U |2 ˆd2)
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D A bound on the Stackelberg value
Using the arguments of the proof of Proposition B.2, the following proposition can be shown.
Proposition D.1. Let G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) be a patrolling problem. Further, let σ be an optimal defender’s
strategy and h ∈ H(σ). Then vallast(h)(σh) = val(σ) = val.
Note that Proposition D.1 cannot be generalized to non-optimal strategies, i.e., for a given non-optimal σ
and h ∈ H(σ) we do not necessarily have that vallast(h)(σh) = val(σ) (a counterexample is easy to find).
Theorem 2.5. For every patrolling problem G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) such that T = U, we have that val ≤(∑
k∈supp(S )
S (k)
k
)−1
where S is the attack signature of G.
Proof. Let σ be an optimal defender’s strategy. For all h ∈ H(σ) and i ∈ N0, let Nodeh,i : R(h) → U be a
function which to every run hw ∈ R(h) assigns the node wi. Further, let µh,i ∈ ∆(U) be a distribution defined
by µh,i(u) = Pσ(Nodeh,i=u)/Pσ(R(h)).
First, we show that for all u ∈ U and i ∈ N0 we have that
∑i+d(u)−1
j=i µuˆ, j(u) ≥ val. Let us fix some u ∈ U
and i ∈ N0, and let Hi(σ) be the set of all h ∈ H(σ) such that |h| = i. For every h ∈ Hi(σ), consider an
attacker’s strategy π such that π(h) = u. Due to Proposition D.1, we have that vallast(h)(σh) = val, which
means that Pσlast(h)(Dlast(h)[πh]) is at least val. Obviously, Pσlast(h)(Dlast(h)[πh]) ≤
∑d(u)−1
j=0 µh, j(u). Thus, we
obtain ∑d(u)−1j=0 µh, j(u) ≥ val. Now it suffices to realize
i+d(u)−1∑
j=i
µuˆ, j(n) =
∑
h∈Hi(σ)
Pσ(R(h)) ·
d(u)−1∑
j=0
µh, j(u)
 ≥ val ·
∑
h∈Hi(σ)
Pσ(R(h)) = val .
Now we can continue with the main proof. Let ℓ = Πk∈supp(S ) k. Since
∑i+d(u)−1
j=i µuˆ, j(u) ≥ val for all
u ∈ U and i ∈ N0 (see above), we immediately obtain ∑ℓ−1j=0 µuˆ, j(u) ≥ val · ℓd(u) . Hence,
ℓ =
ℓ−1∑
j=0
∑
u∈U
µuˆ, j(u) =
∑
u∈U
ℓ−1∑
j=0
µuˆ, j(u) ≥
∑
u∈U
val · ℓd(u) = val ·
∑
k∈supp(S )
S (k) · ℓ
k
Thus, we get val ≤
(∑
k∈supp(S )
S (k)
k
)−1
as desired. 
E Solving patrolling problems with a fully connected environment
Let G = (U, Tuˆ, E, d) be a patrolling problem where T = U, E = U ×U, and let S be the signature of G. We
start by defining the semantics for the “strategy expressions” introduced in Section 2.4 precisely.
• Circle(U〈i, N〉, M, L) denotes the c-modular strategy where c = L · (N/M) such that the distribution µℓ,
where 0 ≤ ℓ < c, selects uniformly among the elements of U〈i + ˆℓ · M, M〉 where ˆℓ = ℓ mod (N/M).
In other words, Circle(U〈i, N〉, M, L) is a strategy which splits U〈i, N〉 into pairwise disjoint subsets of
size M and then “walks around” these sets L times (actually, Circle(U〈i, N〉, M, L) can also be seen as
(N/M)-modular strategy, but for technical reasons we prefer to interpret it as a c-modular strategy).
• if θ1 and θ2 denote c1-modular and c2-modular strategies with underlying distributions µ10, . . . , µ
1
c1−1 and
µ20, . . . , µ
2
c2−1, respectively, then θ1; θ2 denotes the c1+c2-modular strategy with the underlying distribu-
tions µ10, . . . , µ
1
c1−1, µ
2
0, . . . , µ
2
c2−1.
21
• if θ1 and θ2 denote c-modular strategies with underlying distributions µ10, . . . , µ
1
c−1 and µ
2
0, . . . , µ
2
c−1, then
Then νp[θ1, θ2] denotes the c-modular strategy with the underlying distributions µ0, . . . , µc−1, where µi =
(1 − α(p)) · µ1i + α(p) · µ2i for all 0 ≤ i < c.
Now we give a detailed description of the algorithm of Section 2.4. We construct a recursive function
Defend which inputs a triple (U〈i, N〉, D, e), where U〈i, N〉 is the set of nodes to be defended, D is the
number of steps available for defending U〈i, N〉, and e is an expression which represents the “weight” of
the constructed defending strategy in the final distribution ν. The procedure outputs a pair (θ,V) where
θ is an expression specifying a D-modular strategy for U〈i, N〉, and V is an arithmetic expression repre-
senting the guaranteed “coverage” of the targets in U〈i, N〉 when using θ with the weight e. As a side
effect, the function Defend may produce equations for the employed variables. The algorithm is invoked
by Defend(U〈1, |U |〉, d, 1), and the system of equations is initially empty. A call Defend(U〈i, N〉, D, e) is
processed as follows:
• If D | N and N = k · D, then θ = Circle(U〈i, N〉, k, 1). Observe that every node of U〈i, N〉 is visited at
most once in D steps, and this happens with probability D/N. If the weight of θ is e, then this probability
becomes e · (D/N) (since N and D are constants, the expression V = e · (D/N) is parameterized just by
the variables of e). Hence, the function returns the pair (θ,V).
• If N | D and D = k ·N, then θ = Circle(U〈i, N〉, 1, k). Every node of U〈i, N〉 is visited precisely k times in
D steps. If the weight of θ is e, then the probability of visiting a given node in D steps is V = 1− (1− e)k .
The function returns the pair (θ,V).
• If N > D, D ∤ N, and N = k · D + c where 1 ≤ c < D, then we split the set U〈i, N〉 into disjoint subsets
U〈i, k · D〉 and U〈i + k · D, c〉 with precisely k · D and c elements, respectively. Then, we pick a fresh
variable p and issue two recursive calls:
(θ1,V1) = Defend(U〈i, k · D〉, D, (1 − p) · e), (θ2,V2) = Defend(U〈i + k · D, c〉, D, p · e)
The set of equations is enriched by V1 = V2. That is, we require that p is chosen so that the nodes of
U〈i, k · D〉 and U〈i + k · D, c〉 are protected equally well. Then, we put θ = νp[θ1, θ2] and we set V = V1.
The function returns the pair (θ,V).
• Finally, if D > N, N ∤ D, and D = k · N + c where 1 ≤ c < N, we issue two recursive calls:
(θ1,V1) = Defend(U〈i, N〉, k · N, e), (θ2,V2) = Defend(U〈i, N〉, c, e)
This is perhaps the most subtle part of our algorithm. Here we do not split the set U〈i, N〉, but the
number of steps available to protect U〈i, N〉. Intuitively, the constructed strategy θ first tries to loop over
the targets of U〈i, N〉 as long as possible (i.e., for the first k · N steps). This is what θ1 does. Then, θ
tries to exploit the remaining c steps in the best possible way, i.e., by employing θ2. That is, we put
θ = θ1; θ2. If the weight of θ is e, then the targets of U〈i, N〉 are protected with probability at least
V = 1 − (1 − V1)(1 − V2). The function returns the pair (θ,V).
F The existence of a characteristic subdigraph
In this section we prove the non-trivial direction of Theorem 2.7, i.e., we show that if G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) is a
patrolling problem with T = U, a well formed attack signature S , and a sufficiently connected environment,
then MS is (d-preserving isomorphic to) a subdigraph of (U, E).
Let us assume that E is sufficiently connected, and let σ be a defender’s strategy for G such that val(σ) =(∑
k∈supp(S )
S (k)
k
)−1
. Due to Theorem 2.5, we obtain that σ is optimal, i.e., val = val(σ), and hence we can
apply Proposition D.1 to σ.
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We reuse the notation introduced in the proof of Theorem 2.5. In particular, for all h ∈ H(σ) and i ∈ N0,
we use Nodeh,i : R(h) → U to denote a function which to every run hw ∈ R(h) assigns the node wi. Further,
we use µh,i ∈ ∆(U) to denote a distribution defined by µh,i(u) = Pσ(Nodeh,i=u)/Pσ(R(h)). We start by
realizing the following:
Lemma F.1. For all h ∈ H(σ) and u ∈ U, we have that ∑d(u)−1i=0 µh,i(u) = val.
Proof. For all h ∈ H(σ) and u ∈ U we have that
d(u)−1∑
i=0
µh,i(u) ≥ vallast(h)(σh) = val
where the last equality is due to Proposition D.1. Now suppose that there exist some h ∈ H(σ) and u ∈ U
such that
∑d(u)−1
i=0 µh,i(u) > val. Let ℓ = Πk∈supp(S ) k. For every k ∈ supp(S ), we put
α[k] =
∑
u∈U, d(u)=k
ℓ−1∑
i=0
µh,i(u) .
Obviously, ∑k∈supp(S ) α[k] = ℓ. Further, for every k ∈ supp(S ) we have that α[k] ≥ val·S (k)· ℓk , because other-
wise there inevitably exists some 0 ≤ i < ℓ−k and u ∈ U such that d(u) = k and ∑i+d(u)−1j=i µh,i(u) < val, which
means that there exists hh′ ∈ H(σ) such that |h′| = i and ∑d(u)−1j=0 µhh′, j(u) < val. Since vallast(hh′)(σhh′) = val
by Proposition D.1, we have a contradiction.
Since α[k] ≥ val · S (k) · ℓk for all k ∈ supp(S ) and
∑
k∈supp(S ) α[k] = ℓ, we obtain that α[k] = val · S (k) · ℓk
for all k ∈ supp(S ). Similarly, for every k ∈ supp(S ), every u ∈ U where d(u) = k, and every 0 ≤ i < ℓ − k
we must have that ∑i+d(u)−1j=i µh,i(u) ≥ val (otherwise we obtain contradiction in the way indicated above),
which is possible only if ∑i+d(u)−1j=i µh,i(u) = val for all such i and u. In particular, this holds for i = 0, and
the proof is finished. 
Now we present a sequence of observations that reveal a certain form of periodicity in the structure of σ.
The next lemma follows trivially from Lemma F.1.
Lemma F.2. For all h ∈ H(σ) and u ∈ U we have that σ(h)(u) ≤ val(σ).
Lemma F.3. Let h ∈ H(σ) where last(h) = u. Then for every hh′ ∈ H(σ) where |h′| < d(u) we have that
last(h′) , u.
Proof. Suppose the converse. Then there exist hh′ ∈ H(σ) and a node u ∈ U such that last(h) = last(h′) = u
and |h′| < d(u). Due to Proposition D.1, we have that valu(σh) = val. Further, ∑d(u)−1i=0 µh,i(u) = val by
Lemma F.1. However, due to the existence of h′ we obtain that valu(σh) < ∑d(u)−1i=0 µh,i(u), which is a
contradiction. 
Lemma F.4. Let h ∈ H(σ) where last(h) = u. For all i ≥ 0 and hh′ ∈ H(σ) where |h′| = i · d(u) + d(u) − 1
we have that σ(hh′)(u) = val(σ) and u does not appear among the last d(u) − 1 nodes of h′.
Proof. By induction on i. In the base case (i = 0), we have that u does not appear among the last d(u) − 1
nodes of h′ by Lemma F.3. Further, by Lemma F.1 and Lemma F.3 we obtain that valu(σh) = µh,d(u)−1(u).
Hence, µh,d(u)−1(u) = val = val(σ). By Lemma F.2, this is possible only if for all hh′ ∈ H(σ) where
|h′| = d(u) − 1 we have that σ(hh′)(u) = val(σ). For the inductive step, consider hh′h′′ ∈ H(σ) where |h′| =
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i ·d(u)+d(u)−1 and |h′′| = d(u). By applying induction hypothesis to hh′, we obtain that σ(hh′)(u) = val(σ).
If u was revisited in the last d(u) − 1 nodes of h′′, we would have ∑d(u)−1i=0 µhh′,i(u) > val, which contradicts
Lemma F.1. If σ(hh′h′′)(u) < val(σ), we obtain ∑d(u)−1i=0 µhh′u′,i(u) < val, where u′ is the first node of h′′,
which again contradicts Lemma F.1. 
Lemma F.5. Let hh′ ∈ H(σ) where last(h) = last(h′) = u. Then d(u) divides |h′|.
Proof. Directly from Lemma F.4. 
Lemma F.6. Let h ∈ H(σ) where last(h) = u. For every i ∈ N, there exist hh′ ∈ H(σ) such that |h′| = i ·d(u)
and last(h′) = u.
Proof. Immediate. 
For the rest of this section, let us fix a history h = u0 · · · um ∈ H(σ) such that every node of U appears
in h (such an h must exist). For every u ∈ U, let us fix some j ≤ m such that u j = u, and let offset(u) =
j−
⌊ j
d(u)
⌋
· d(u). Note that due to Lemma F.5, the definition of offset(u) is independent of the concrete choice
of j. For every k ∈ supp(S ) and every i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, let Vk[i] be the set of all nodes u ∈ U such that
d(u) = k and offset(u) = i.
Lemma F.7. Let k, k′ ∈ supp(S ), i ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, i′ ∈ {0, . . . , k′−1}, and 0 ≤ ℓ < k · k′ where i = ℓmod k
and i′ = ℓ+1 mod k′. Then for all u ∈ Vk[i] and u′ ∈ Vk′[i′] we have that (u, u′) ∈ E.
Proof. Due to Lemma F.6, there exist hh′ ∈ H(σ) and hh′′ ∈ H(σ) such that |h′| = ℓ, |h′′| = ℓ + 1,
last(h′) = u, and last(h′′) = u′. By Lemma F.4, we obtain σ(hh′)(u′) = val, which means (u, u′) ∈ E. 
Lemma F.8. For all k ∈ supp(S ) and i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, the set Vk[i] contains exactly S (k)/k nodes.
Proof. By applying Lemma F.1. 
Due to Lemma F.8, we have that for all k ∈ supp(S ) and i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, the set Vk[i] has exactly
S (k)/k elements, which we denote by vk[i, 1], . . . , vk[i, S (k)/k]. Due to Lemma F.7, for every pair of nodes
vk[i, j] and vk′[i′, j′], such that i = ℓmod k and i′ = (ℓ+1) mod k′ for some 0 ≤ ℓ < k · k′ we have that
(vk[i, j], vk′ [i′, j′]) ∈ E. Hence, (U, E) contains a subdigraph which is d-preserving isomorphic to MS .
G Complexity of finding the characteristic subdigraph
In this section we prove two claims leading to combined Theorem 2.8 via Theorem 2.7. We will focus on
a subclass of patrolling problems G = (U, T, uˆ, E, d) such that T = U, supp(S ) = {k}. In such a case, for a
well-formed attack signature S , we have that |U | = n is divisible by k and that the characteristic digraph Ms
has a particularly nice description: Ms has a node set u0, . . . un−1 and uiu j is an arc iff j = (i + 1) mod k.
Our proofs will actually be expressed in terms of a special equitable k-colouring of the complementary
digraph H = (U, E ) of the environment E (i.e., H having precisely those arcs, but not the loops, which
are absent in E): Let |U | = |V(H)| = a · k. The task is to find a colouring c : V(H) → {1, 2, . . . , k} of the
node set such that (a) |c−1(i)| = a for each i = 1, . . . , k, and (b) no arc xy of H receives colours c(x) = j,
c(y) = ( j mod k) + 1 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , k} (while both x, y might receive the same colour). Comparing this
with the definition of Ms one immediately concludes that (U, E) contains a subdigraph isomorphic to Ms if,
and only if, the complement H has a special equitable k-colouring.
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Lemma G.1. For a simple digraph H on an even number of nodes, one can find in polynomial time a special
equitable 2-colouring of H, if it exists.
Proof. Note that our definition of a special 2-colouring does not allow for arcs having two distinct colours
on their nodes, in either order. Hence every weak component of H must be monochromatic (recall that a
weak component is a connected component of the underlying undirected graph of H). The problem thus
reduces to finding a subset of weak components of H summing to exactly half of the nodes of H. This we
solve in polynomial time by two folklore algorithms; finding the weak components by BFS, and solving the
knapsack problem in unary notation by standard dynamic programming. 
Lemma G.2. Let k ∈ N, k ≥ 3. Assume a simple digraph H such that |V(H)| is divisible by k. Then it is
NP-complete to decide whether H has a special equitable k-colouring.
Proof. First to say, there does not seem to be an easy way how to reduce a case of k ≥ 3 to that of k + 1,
and so we have to provide hardness reductions for each considered value of k. We reduce from the folklore
NP-complete problem of two-colouring 3-uniform hypergraph: Given is a ground set X and a family F of
3-element subsets of X (hyperedges). The task is to decide whether the elements of X can be assigned one
of two colours each such that no set in F is monochromatic.
(k = 3) For such a 3-uniform hypergraph (X,F ) we first construct an equivalent instance H of the
special equitable 3-colouring problem. Let a = 3|F | + |X|. 2 We denote by A3 the digraph of a′ = a + |F |
nodes s1, s2, . . . , sa′ and of a′−1 arcs s1si for i = 2, . . . , a′ (A3 is a star), and by B the digraph on a−|F | nodes
with no arcs at all. Then we construct a digraph G3 on the node set X ∪ F 3 where F 3 is a set containing
exactly three distinct copies f , f ′, f ′′ of each hyperedge f ∈ F . The arcs of G3 are given as follows; for
each f = {x1, x2, x3} ∈ F there is a directed 6-cycle on the nodes x1, f , x2, f ′, x3, f ′′ in this cyclic order (a
permutation of x1, x2, x3 is irrelevant, though). A digraph H is constructed from the disjoint union of A3, B
and G3, by adding arcs from the node s1 to all the nodes in X of G3.
Then H has exactly a+ |F |+a− |F |+ |X|+3|F | = 3a nodes, and we claim that H has a special equitable
3-colouring if, and only if, (X,F ) is two-colourable. In the forward direction, up to symmetry between the
colours, we may assume that s1 gets colour 1, and so all nodes of A3 have colours 1 or 3. We argue the
following properties:
(i) The nodes in X can only receive colours 1, 3.
(ii) Among the nodes of G3 not in X, at least |F | of them must receive colour 2.
Here (i) follows from the fact that each node in X ends an arc starting in s1 (of A3) of colour 1. To get
(ii), notice that we have to assign colour 2 to exactly a nodes which cannot appear in A3 and in X due to s1
having colour 1. We can give colour 2 to the nodes of B, yet, at least a − |B| = |F | of the nodes of colour 2
must be in G3 \ X.
Now we prove that if (i),(ii) hold true, then the hypergraph (X,F ) is two-colourable. Consider one of
the 6-cycles of G3, say the one on the nodes x1, f , x2, f ′, x3, f ′′. It cannot happen c( f ) = c( f ′) = 2 —in
such a case, depending on the colour c(x2), there would be an arc in G3 coloured with a forbidden pair 1, 2
or 2, 3. Hence each of the 6-cycles defining the arcs of G3 (for each f = {x1, x2, x3} ∈ F ) has at most one
vertex of colour 2, and so exactly one such. Up to symmetry, let c( f ) = 2 in (any) one of the cycles. Then
c(x1) , c(x2), since otherwise c(x1) = c(x2) ∈ {1, 3} would again give a forbidden pair of colours 1, 2 or 2, 3,
respectively. Consequently, taking the colouring c restricted to X, no hyperedge in F is monochromatic and
(X,F ) is two-colourable.
2Although the formula for a might seem arbitrary now, this precise expression will become relevant with the case of k = 6.
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Conversely, consider a two-colourable 3-uniform hypergraph (X,F ). Let the colours occuring in X be
1 and 3. We extend this to a special equitable 3-colouring of our digraph H as follows. If a hyperedge
f = {x1, x2, x3} ∈ F is coloured 1, 1, 3, then we assign colours 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 2 in order to the 6-cycle on
the nodes x1, f , x2, f ′, x3, f ′′ in G3. If this f = {x1, x2, x3} ∈ F is coloured 1, 3, 3, then we assign colours
1, 1, 3, 3, 3, 2 in order to the same 6-cycle. We finally assign colour 1 to s1, colour 2 to all nodes of B (and
so c−1(2) = a), and an arbitrary choice of colours 1, 3 to the remaining nodes of A3 in order to “balance”
c−1(1) = c−1(3) = a.
(k = 4) Second, we modify the previous construction of H for the case of k = 4. We use the same B
and G3. We replace A3 with a digraph A4 which is the complete digraph on a′ = a+ |F | nodes s1, s2, . . . , sa′ ,
too. Then we add a new digraph C4 formed by a nodes with no arcs between. H is constructed from a
disjoint union of A4,C4, B and G3 by adding all the arcs from s1 to C4 and all the arcs between the nodes of
A4 and of X ⊆ V(G3) in both directions. Clearly, H has 4a nodes.
Consider a special equitable 4-colouring of H. Again, up to symmetry, let the colour of s1 be 1. Then
whole A4 and X may only receive colours 1 or 3 and (i) holds true again. Since no node of C4 may be
coloured 2 due to the existence of an arc from s1, and since B (which may be coloured by 2) has size a− |F |,
we get (ii), too. Now, notice that the argument following (i),(ii) above did not use the pair of colours 3, 1 as
forbidden, and so it applies now as well; (X,F ) is two-colourable.
Conversely, consider a two-colourable 3-uniform hypergraph (X,F ). Then, exactly as in the case of
k = 3, we get a valid colouring of A4 ∪ B ∪ G3 which we complement by assigning colour 4 to whole C4.
This results in a special equitable 4-colouring of H.
(k ≥ 5) Third, we define a general construction for all the values k = 5, 6, . . . . We use the same gadgets
G3, B, and A4, and introduce k−3 disjoint copies of C4 which we denote by C4,C5 and D5, . . . , Dk−1. Again,
on the disjoint union of all these digraphs (which has k · a nodes) we define H by adding
• all the arcs between the nodes of A4 and of D5 ∪ · · · ∪ Dk−1 in both directions,
• all the arcs between the nodes of A4 ∪ D5 ∪ · · · ∪ Dk−1 and the nodes X of G3 in both directions,
• all the arcs between the nodes of D5 ∪ · · · ∪ Dk−1 and of B in both directions,
• all the arcs between s1 and the nodes of C4 in both directions, and the same between s2 and C5.
Consider a special equitable k-colouring of H. For simplicity we call the forbidden pairs of colours
j, ( j mod k) + 1 as adjacent. Since A4 ∪D5 ∪ · · · ∪Dk−1 has (k − 4)a+ 1 nodes, at least k− 3 distinct colours
must occur there. However, A4 (of > a nodes) itself gets at least two distinct non-adjacent colours c1, c2
which cannot be adjacent to any of the colours occuring in D5 ∪ · · · ∪ Dk−1 other than c1, c2. A simple case
analysis shows that the only valid choice of colours is c1 = 1, c2 = 3 and remaining 5, 6, . . . , k − 1, up to
rotation symmetry. Consequently, A4 holds only colours 1, 3 and each of the colours 5, 6, . . . , k − 1 occurs
somewhere in D5 ∪ · · · ∪ Dk−1. In particular, no node of A4 ∪ D5 ∪ · · · ∪ Dk−1 is coloured 2.
Which nodes could have colour 2? Due to the arcs to and from s1, s2 in A4, all the nodes of colour 2
belong to B ∪ (G3 \ X), and since G3 \ X has 3|F | < a nodes, we have c−1(2) ∩ B , ∅. This has a twofold
consequence; first, (ii) holds true also in this case, and second, colours 1, 3 cannot occur in D5 ∪ · · · ∪ Dk−1.
Then, by simple counting, c−1(5) ∪ · · · ∪ c−1(k − 1) must be exactly the node set of D5 ∪ · · · ∪ Dk−1, and
hence X cannot get any of the colours 5, . . . , k − 1. Neither colours 2, 4 or k could occur in X due to the arcs
to and from A4, which concludes that (i) holds true, too. Theorefore, (X,F ) is two-colourable.
Conversely, consider a two-colourable 3-uniform hypergraph (X,F ). We colour G3 ∪ A4 by 1, 2, 3 as
above while giving c(s1) = 1 and c(s2) = 3. Then we assign colour 2 to whole B, colour 4 to whole C4,
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colour k to whole C5, and colours j to whole D j for j = 5, . . . , k−1. Again, this results in a special equitable
k-colouring of H. 
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